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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4739
___________
ZHONG BIAO YANG,
                                                                         Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A072-766-263)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 8, 2010
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge,  HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 13, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Zhong Biao Yang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order
entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying Yang’s motion to reopen
his exclusion/deportation proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will grant the
2petition for review and remand for further proceedings.
Because the parties are familiar with the lengthy history of this case, we merely
summarize the background relevant to our consideration of the issues presented.  In 1994,
Yang conceded that he is excludable from the United States, and he applied for asylum
and withholding of exclusion.  Yang claimed, inter alia, that he was persecuted in China
based on his opposition to family planning policies.  In 1996, the BIA affirmed an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying Yang’s applications for relief.
In 2001, the BIA granted Yang’s unopposed motion to reopen proceedings in light
of passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
which altered the definition of “refugee” in INA § 101(a)(42) to include persons
subjected to coercive family planning policies.  In 2003, Yang and his wife (who was in
deportation proceedings herself) testified before an IJ in New York.  Among other things,
Yang claimed that, as the father of three children (two born in the United States), he will
be forcibly sterilized upon return to China for having violated the one-child policy.
The IJ denied relief, concluding that both Yang and his wife failed to establish past
or future persecution.  The BIA addressed the appeals of Yang and his wife separately,
and it dismissed Yang’s appeal in 2004.  It held, inter alia, that Yang had failed to prove a
well-founded fear that he will be forcibly sterilized.  Yang sought review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which, in 2005, vacated the BIA’s
decision in Yang’s case under a “Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal”
      Yang’s wife had an IUD forcibly inserted in 1994, shortly after giving birth to the1
couple’s first child.  She testified that she experienced physical problems with the IUD
and had a private doctor remove it in 2000.  She entered the United States later that same
year and was placed in deportation proceedings.  As mentioned, the couple then had two
children in the United States, born in 2001 and 2002.
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entered between the parties.  The Court of Appeals remanded for reconsideration on the
sole issue of whether Yang’s wife’s forced IUD resulted in physical discomfort rising to
the level of persecution, and, if so, whether such harm is a protected ground for relief.1
The BIA remanded to an IJ for fact-finding.  After Yang was granted a change of
venue, an IJ in New Jersey conducted a hearing on April 2, 2007, and denied relief.  The
IJ held, inter alia, that, even if the wife’s forced IUD resulted in physical problems, the
harm did not rise to the level of persecution.
On July 23, 2008, the BIA affirmed and dismissed Yang’s appeal (the BIA issued
a separate decision addressing the wife’s appeal).  The BIA noted that the only contested
issue on Yang’s appeal was whether his wife’s forced IUD entitled Yang to relief.  It held
that, even if the wife’s suffering due to the forced IUD is viewed as persecution, Yang is
not entitled to relief based solely on his wife’s persecution. 
On October 16, 2008, Yang filed a motion to reopen in which he claimed, as he
had previously, that he fears forced sterilization upon return to China.  Yang attached
numerous documents as exhibits to his motion, and he argued that the documents
constitute new, previously unavailable evidence which establishes his prima facie
eligibility for relief from exclusion.
4On December 18, 2008, the BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that Yang’s
claim was previously litigated and he failed to establish eligibility for relief based on a
claim that he will be forcibly sterilized.  Yang petitioned this Court for review.  After a
motions panel granted a stay of Yang’s removal, the government filed an unopposed
motion to remand the matter so that the BIA could clarify which documents it had
considered in denying the motion to reopen, and to address Yang’s evidence further if
appropriate.  This Court granted the motion to remand.
On remand, the BIA issued a decision on November 30, 2009, in which it
addressed Yang’s evidence and again denied the motion to reopen.  The BIA noted that it
would only consider whether Yang’s proffered evidence establishes that there has been a
“relevant change in circumstances” in China since his 2003 hearing before the IJ.  It held
that Yang’s evidence, to the extent that it is relevant and was previously unavailable, does
not indicate that country conditions have changed materially such that Yang has an
objective, well-founded fear that he will be persecuted upon return to China.  Yang timely
filed a petition for review in this Court.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review the November 30,
2009, decision denying Yang’s motion to reopen.  See Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240,
246 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review the BIA’s decision for abuse of discretion and will
reverse only if the BIA is shown to have acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law. 
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).
5Yang argues that the BIA erred as a matter of law by effectively treating his
motion to reopen as untimely filed, which caused the BIA to apply an incorrect standard
of review to the motion.  Petitioner’s Br. at 11-14.  Yang notes that he moved to reopen
the BIA’s July 23, 2008, decision, which he contends was the “final administrative
decision” in the case.  Because the motion to reopen was filed within ninety days of July
23, he argues that the BIA erred in requiring him to show “changed circumstances” in
China in order to reopen the case.  We agree with Yang that the BIA erred.
In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the
final administrative decision was rendered.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  If a motion to
reopen is timely filed, the standard that governs its consideration provides in relevant part
that it “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be
offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented
at the former hearing[.]”  Id. § 1003.2(c)(1).  After expiration of the ninety-day period, an
alien can seek to reopen the proceedings only in limited circumstances, such as where the
alien claims “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ..., if such
evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or
presented at the previous hearing.”  Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Here, while the BIA twice stated in its decision that Yang’s motion to reopen was
“timely filed,” it nevertheless assessed Yang’s proffered evidence under the changed-
circumstances standard that governs a motion to reopen filed after expiration of the
      While Yang suggests that “[t]he BIA’s decision is nothing more than an attempt to2
foist a more onerous burden of proof on Yang,” Petitioner’s Br. at 14, the record does not
support Yang’s cynicism.  In fact, the BIA’s confusion over the governing standard seems
to have resulted mainly from the protracted history of this case.  As the BIA correctly
observed, Yang’s motion to reopen was based on the same claim, i.e., fear of forced
sterilization, that he litigated before the IJ in 2003.  The proceedings that followed the
2003 hearing were limited to whether his wife’s forced IUD gave rise to a cognizable
claim of persecution.  Thus, the BIA properly viewed Yang’s motion as seeking to reopen
a claim that was litigated in 2003, although it then erred in failing to apply the standards
that govern a timely filed motion to reopen such as Yang’s.  Yang himself may have
exacerbated the confusion by suggesting in his motion to reopen that his “documents were
previously unavailable and show changed country conditions from the time [Yang] was
ordered excluded in 1997.”  A.R. at 31 (emphasis added).  As explained, Yang did not
need to show changed conditions to proceed with his timely filed motion to reopen.
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ninety-day limitations period.  In effect, the BIA treated Yang’s motion as an untimely
filed request to reopen the 2003 hearing on his claim that he will be forcibly sterilized in
China.  But as both parties and even the BIA seem to acknowledge, the motion to reopen
was timely filed within ninety days of the July 23, 2008, decision – which was the “final
administrative decision” in Yang’s case.  See Filja, 447 F.3d at 253 (observing that “[t]he
usual deadline for filing a motion to reopen is 90 days after entry of a final order of
removal”).  Consequently, because Yang’s motion to reopen was timely, the BIA erred as
a matter of law in applying the changed-circumstances standard that governs motions
filed after expiration of the ninety-day limitations period.  2
Although we are reluctant to remand this matter yet again, we are constrained to do
so on the record before us.  The BIA’s decision to reject the evidence supporting Yang’s
motion to reopen was firmly intertwined with its erroneous application of the changed-
7circumstances standard.  As the BIA explained its holding: “the proffered evidence does
not indicate that circumstances in China have changed materially since the last hearing
such that [Yang] would have an objective[,] well-founded fear of persecution upon return
to China.”  A.R. at 6.  Where, as here, “the possibility exists that the [BIA]’s exercise of
its discretion was tainted by consideration of improper or irrelevant factors, remand to the
[BIA] is an appropriate remedy.”  Chung v. INS, 602 F.2d 608, 612 n.3 (3d Cir. 1979).
For these reasons, we will grant the petition for review and remand this matter to
the BIA for further proceedings on Yang’s motion to reopen consistent with this Opinion.
